Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 83
Issue 1 Spring

Article 11

Spring 1992

Suppressing Domestic Violence with Law Reforms
Daniel D. Polsby

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Daniel D. Polsby, Suppressing Domestic Violence with Law Reforms, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 250 (1992-1993)

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/92/8301-0250
THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY

Copyright 0 1992 by Northwestern University, School of Law

Vol. 83, No. I
Printedin U.S.A.

SUPPRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
WITH LAW REFORMS
DANIEL D. POLSBY*
The timely message of these papers is that specific deterrence is
not so simple an idea as it seems. One of the purposes of criminal
punishment is to change the behavior of the offender by associating
negative reinforcements, such as fines and detention, with misbehavior. Arrest also counts as a negative reinforcement. For any
criminal contemplating a crime, prison time is the most disagreeable
but also least probable foreseeable consequence of his anticipated
transgression. Fear of arrest, less obnoxious but far more probable
than serving time, may actually loom larger in the criminal's calculations than fear of what may happen if the criminal process plays
through to its classical conclusion.
The idea of specific deterrence is the most instinctive of penal
policies. One need not be a rat psychologist to appreciate that associating a negative reinforcement with a given behavior makes that
behavior less likely to recur; even small children have this intuition.
So if it is obvious that getting oneself arrested is tallied as a "negative" experience, it follows that arresting someone for a given offense will make that individual less likely to commit that offense in
the future. The process is just the same as that in the psychology
laboratory, where white rats are taught to avoid a certain behavior
by repeated electric shocks. Would that life were so simple.
It is useful, every so often, for those who have wandered far
into the wilderness of theory to take a breather with empirical
materials, if only as a reminder of how untidy the real world is compared with the laboratory. The traditional law of most jurisdictions
allowed police officers to arrest persons suspected of committing
misdemeanors (such as unarmed assault) only where a warrant had
been issued or where the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence. Spousal quarrels usually occur in private; and officers called to the scene of domestic quarrels have traditionally
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
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limited themselves to curbstone social work, conciliating and mollifying as best they could before leaving the scene.
By the mid-1980's, almost all jurisdictions had enacted legislation that allowed officers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests if
there was probable cause to believe that a spousal assault had occurred. Indeed, a number ofjurisdictions adopted the questionable
policy of requiringofficers to arrest in such circumstances. This represented a significant broadening of law enforcement powers which
one would expect to lead to a noticeable decline, if not in the overall
rate of complaints, then at least in the recidivism of offenders,
whose infractions could now be sanctioned far more cheaply than
previously. The early returns from Minneapolis seemed to support
this prediction. Men who were arrested for misdemeanor spouse
assault were found significantly less likely in that study to return to
the attention of police than were members of control groups who
received less coercive treatment.
Ten years and many replications later, researchers are no
longer confident that mandatory arrest is a panacea for domestic
violence; in fact it may make matters worse. How can this be? There
are fairly dramatic differences between offenders in how they respond to the prospect of arrest. Respectable middle class folks, with
much valuable reputational capital at stake, are clearly more averse
to arrest-in this context as in most others-than are the more socially marginal individuals who have less to lose and who form the
traditional clientele of police courts and uniformed peace officers.
The new research suggests that the sort of man who is undeterred
by the prospect of arrest may actually be provoked into further acts
of aggression against family members who are perceived as having
been the cause of trouble with the police.
If the problem of intrafamilial violence does not yield to simple
changes in law enforcement policy, no one should be amazed. The
problem is almost by definition hard to deal with, rooted as it usually is in the subtle nuances and private complexities of familial relationships, about which law enforcement authorities-and for that
matter close friends and family members-typically lack much crucial information. It is proverbial how difficult it is for even friendly
outsiders-much less police officers-to intervene constructively in
the affairs of a given family. And even if this were not true one
should recognize that a budget-constrained legal system will never
devote significant post-arrest resources to the prosecution, incarceration and rehabilitation of offenders who have, after all, usually
been guilty only of a simple misdemeanor.
What, then, should be done? Is there nothing worthwhile that
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law can do to protect women and children from assaults by male
family members? Perhaps not. It is not necessarily the case that
well-intended legal interventions make things better, and the rate of
intraspousal assault may be an equilibrium-distributed event, like
dog bites and drownings, that will persistently occur with a certain
statistical frequency in a given cohort of people regardless of what
social policies are in force. On the other hand, it may be that subjecting intra-family violence to policing tactics that are more aggressive than those used with other forms of assault, and perhaps
separately criminalizing it, may over some longer period have a general deterrent effect.
It would not be surprising if it took a generation or more for a
change in a general deterrent mechanism to work its way into a lowered rate of spouse abuse. Unlike specific deterrence, general deterrence works vicariously: people alter their behavior because of
what they see has happened to other people. That sort of information gets around by word of mouth, as opposed to specific deterrence, where one learns the lesson personally or not at all. In
principle, then, one would like to have twenty or thirty years to test
the hypothesis that aggressive police intervention in domestic violence incidents will depress the rate of intrafamilial assault. Unfortunately, over that period of time so many other variables in the
equation will have changed so much that measuring the general deterrent effect of the law may not be possible. That is nothing new:
general deterrence is notoriously hard to measure in any situation.
Increasing the availability of self help to discourage spousal assault is an avenue that the legal system seems not to have considered. The rules of common law governing the privilege of self
defense (legislatively enacted in most states) are exceptionally stingy
about when a person may use a weapon in self defense. It is always
required that the threat be "imminent," and a weapon may not be
used unless the defender reasonably fears death, great bodily harm,
or a forcible felony from her attacker. These rules have considerable validity for governing the encounters of strangers, but one may
question whether it makes sense to apply them in the same way to
family situations. Between strangers, requiring that a threat be imminent before it can be responded to is the best way to minimize
violence in casual encounters. No one can read the mind or motives
of another person with certainty, but once someone poses an imminent threat to another, much ambiguity and uncertainty about his
reasonably expectable behavior, at least in the very short-run future,
will surely be gone.
Domestic partners cannot read one another's minds either, but
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it is reasonable to believe they can do a far better job of it than can
complete strangers. The predicament of a chronically abused wife is
that she lives with a standing threat rather than an imminent one;
but she has far more information and far less uncertainty than a
stranger about the identity and probable behavior of her expected
attacker. A modest relaxation in the requirement that a threat be
"imminent" before a weapon could be resorted to would be justifiable in the domestic setting-especially since, once the threat had
become imminent as one would understand the term to apply between strangers, it would often be too late as a practical matter for
her to get a weapon to defend herself with. Similarly, the law might
deem repeated unarmed assaults as "forcible felonies" for purposes
of invoking the right of self-protection, notwithstanding the fact that
unarmed assault, even between mismatched combatants, is usually
considered a misdemeanor (not giving rise to a right of armed self
defense).
If one's objective is to reduce the amount of intrafamilial violence, easing the rules for invoking self-defense-that is, reducing
the expected cost of self-help for victims-seems at least as promising as the orthodox approach. But of course one must recognize
the possibility that neither change would have much measurable
effect.
Nonetheless, one can defend such reforms. It may not be "effective" but it is certainly proper for police officers to arrest where
there is probable cause to believe that a certain person has beaten
another. It may not affect the crime statistics but it is certainlyfair to
allow a woman to defend herself from repeated attack by her husband. Recognizing these as legitimate values of the community may
not be "useful" in the sense of doing much for the crime rate. But it
may do justice, which is itself a pretty useful attribute for a legal system to possess.
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Professor James B. Haddad brought great depth and knowledge
to Northwestern University School of Law, as a scholar, a teacher, a
faculty member and most importantly, as an individual. His varied
experiences as a state prosecutor and defense attorney added to the
breadth of his knowledge, and he had a unique ability to impart this
knowledge to his students. The following tributes, written by close
friends, colleagues and former students, memorialize James Haddad. His absence at Northwestern University will be felt by faculty
and students alike, but his spirit will live on as a lasting inspiration.
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